The Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) has been dramatically reshaped since 2000. While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is still the world’s largest and most capable provider of emer￾gency liquidity, as well as the only one that operates at a global level, it is now flanked by multiple regional financial arrangements (RFAs) whose combined lending capacity equals that of the IMF. RFAs have become indispensable actors in preventing and managing currency crises and balance of payment crises in many regions, either alone or in partnership with the IMF, even though their geographic coverage is incomplete and their resources vary enormously (Mühlich, Fritz and Kring 2021). To effectively manage international financial crises in regions where RFAs operate, it is essen￾tial to understand how they operate. RFAs are not just financial firefighters that spring into action when crisis hits. Several of them have established formal or informal economic surveillance units to provide ongoing economic policy advice, to identify potential sources of regional financial instability and to inform emergency liquidity provision in the event of an actual crisis.While it is difficult to make general statements about the economic approaches and effects of RFAs, in all cases, they concentrate on the interests and preferences of regional economies rather than reflecting the interests of the world’s largest economies. Developing independent surveillance func￾tions is also essential to any RFA that is not content to rely on the IMF for surveillance. Without the ability to analyze emergent economic situations or to design rescue packages, RFAs have little option but to operate as adjuncts either to the IMF or, in some cases, to the interests of their own domi￾nant members. Recipients of IMF lending have expressed dissatisfaction with conditionality over the years, which may reflect differing analyses of a given situation. This highlights the need for RFAs to develop their own surveillance capabilities.